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Google Books: Game, Set, But Not Match
Prof. James Gibson, University of Richmond School of Law
November 20, 2013
It’s back: Google Books, our favorite topic in this Intellectual Property Viewpoints
series. Google Books is the project through which Google has brought its search capability to
the text of more than 20 millions books (with the number still growing). To do so, Google must
scan the book and convert the scan to readable text. And there’s the problem: Scanning is
copying, and copying raises the question of whether the massive project is a massive violation of
the copyrights in all those books. Thus the Authors Guild v. Google class action brought by
authors and publishers against Google in a federal district court in New York.
Our earlier discussions of the case include antitrust and procedural problems with a proposed –
but ultimately rejected – settlement, concerns about the direction the controversy might take in
the aftermath of that rejection, musings about how the whole thing might be resolved
by Congress or a public commission, and evaluations of Google’s chances on prevailing on a fair
use argument, both in the abstract and in light of a ruling in the related Authors Guild v.
Hathitrust case involving university libraries that provided books to Google for scanning.
Now the case has finally produced a ruling on fair use, and it is a clean win for Google. The
decision has already generated a huge volume of commentary, and will probably continue to do
so both here and elsewhere. In this essay, however, I thought I would start at the most basic
level of analysis: the black-letter law that underlies the judge’s decision.
Although fair use has a long and storied history, its modern statutory incarnation lists four factors
that inform the analysis: (1) the purpose and character of the defendant’s use, (2) the nature of
the plaintiff’s copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion the defendant
used, and (4) the effect of the defendant’s use upon the potential market for the plaintiff’s
work. Although all four factors should be considered, one lesson from earlier copyright cases is
that it’s not just a matter of math; one party can prevail on three factors and yet lose the
case. Moreover, the factors are interdependent, such that a court’s analysis of one factor can
significantly influence the analysis of the others.
A prime example of this interdependence is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court’s 1994
decision that held, or at least strongly suggested, that rap group 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy
Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” was a fair use. In that case, the Court held that the purpose of 2
Live Crew’s use (the first factor) was parody, and that parody was a favored use in fair use
analysis for various reasons, including that a parody transforms the underlying original rather
than supersedes it. This holding colored the inquiry into the rest of the factors; in essence, it
excused the fact that the original song was highly original (the second factor), that quite a lot of
that originality was copied (the third factor), and that there might be a market for parodies (the
fourth factor – ask Weird Al Yankovic).
A similar dynamic informed the Google Books decision. Relying on Campbell, the court first
focused on whether Google’s use was transformative, and concluded that it was. “Google Books
digitizes books and transforms expressive text into a comprehensive word index that helps
readers, scholars, researchers, and others find books.” Of particular interest is the court’s
conclusion that the use was transformative even though the expression in the copyrighted works

was not itself transformed. This makes the Google Books decision different from Campbell, but
here the court could cite a 2007 Second Circuit case, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, that held
Google’s image search to be a fair use because it used the copyrighted images to facilitate
research (a historically favored fair use) and information location rather than to supersede the
expressive purpose of the originals.
The court’s decision that Google uses books in a highly transformative way essentially decided
the case. It led the court to discount the fact that Google is a commercial enterprise – another
first-factor consideration, and one that distinguishes Google from the defendants in
the Hathitrust litigation. And the court then proceeded to dispose of the remaining three factors
in fewer pages than it spent on the first alone. It blew through the second factor in five
sentences, finding that it favored Google because most of the books are non-fiction. (One might
think that this finding might dictate a different fair use outcome for some books over others, but
instead the court found that it was a reason to bless Google Books as a whole. Again we see the
overall transformative purpose – the utility of a comprehensive searchable database – affect the
other factors.) The third factor received equally cursory treatment; indeed, the court did not even
cite the cases (e.g., Sega v. Accolade) that best support the proposition that wholesale copying
can be fair use as long as the defendant’s ultimate use reveals little or none of the plaintiff’s
copyrighted expression. And discussion of the final factor, which is usually the most weighty of
the four, was limited to the question of whether Google Books serves as a market substitute for
reading the plaintiffs’ books. (It does not, but that simplistic fact alone is not enough to tell us
whether other markets for the books – such as licensing markets – are similarly unaffected.)
That said, the ultimate outcome here is probably the correct one, and it’s certainly better than the
outcome we would have had if the court had approved the proposed settlement back in
2011. For one thing, a fair use ruling allows others to compete with Google, whereas the
settlement would have granted Google, and Google alone, the necessary licenses. Of course,
even with fair use’s aegis, the up-front costs of creating a competing database are daunting, such
that Google may have a natural monopoly. But who is to say that the libraries that gave Google
the books in the first place – and that now have digital copies of the scanned texts themselves –
won’t be willing to share them with a second comer?
So Google has gone a long way to winning the case on fair use grounds. Game and set to
Google. But not quite match. The plaintiffs have already announced their plans to appeal to the
Second Circuit. Their odds may not be good; the appeals court has previously hinted that it’s
open to the fair use argument. (Indeed, the judge who issued last week’s fair use ruling is
actually an appeals judge sitting by designation in the district court – Denny Chin, an
increasingly influential jurist on cutting-edge copyright cases. He won’t hear the appeal of his
own decision, of course.) Only one thing is certain: We are not done talking about this case yet.
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